Sines, et al. v. Kessler, et al., 3:17CV72, 11/22/2021 APPEARANCES CONTINUED: 1 2 For the Plaintiffs: MICHAEL L. BLOCH, ESQUIRE ROBERTA A. KAPLAN, ESQUIRE 3 Kaplan Hecker & Fink LLP 350 Fifth Avenue, Suite 7110 4 New York, NY 10118 212.763.0883 5 KAREN L. DUNN, ESQUIRE 6 WILLIAM A. ISAACSON, ESQUIRE Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & 7 Garrison LLP 2001 K Street, NW 8 Washington, DC 20006 For the Defendants: 9 DAVID L. CAMPBELL, ESQUIRE Duane, Hauck, Davis, Gravatt & 10 Campbell, P.C. 100 West Franklin Street, Suite 100 11 Richmond, VA 23220 804.644.7400 12 BRYAN J. JONES, ESQUIRE Bryan J. Jones, Attorney at law 13 106 W. South Street, Suite 211 14 Charlottesville, VA 22902 540.623.6952 15 JAMES E. KOLENICH, ESQUIRE 16 Kolenich Law Office 9435 Waterstone Blvd., Suite 140 17 Cincinnati, OH 45249 513.444.2150 18 JOSHUA SMITH, ESQUIRE 19 (Appearing via Zoom) Smith LLC 20 807 Crane Avenue Pittsburgh, PA 15216 21 917.567.3168 22 RICHARD SPENCER, PRO SE P.O. Box 1676

Whitefish, MT 59937

23

24

MR. CAMPBELL: Sure. Your Honor, basically just that we believe that doing this transcript would open Pandora's box and would encourage the jury to do that with everything they're

23

24

having difficulty recalling of nearly four weeks of testimony.

And then I quote the Fourth Circuit as well and say that the Court didn't respond with a preference. The Court just answered the jury's request with -- consistent with the Court's earlier instructions. And there hasn't been, as the Fourth Circuit requires, a reasonably well-focused request for a specific answer to be read from the transcript. That's not what they asked for. They just asked for the whole transcript. So if they do come back and make any reasonably well-focused request, I think the Court should possibly reconsider its ruling. But at this time having already ruled -- or not ruled, but having already responded to the jury, and there being no additional -- any specific or reasonably well-focused question in response following them being told that they couldn't have the transcript, I think the Court should leave it as it is.

THE COURT: Well, the only thing that concerns me is that the original instructions I gave them was sort of a blanket statement that it was not -- they could not obtain the transcript or a reading of it. And it concerns me. I would hate to get a hung jury and find out that it could have been resolved -- some issue could have been resolved if some issue had been cleared up for them.

MR. CAMPBELL: And Your Honor, I don't think, at least to my recollection -- and perhaps the court reporter or Your Honor's staff could find out -- I don't believe there was

a blanket prohibition to read-backs. I think it was just as to providing them the transcript.

THE COURT: I think earlier when I first instructed the jury I think I told them that they could not -- we've indicated the transcripts are not available. I told them that in pretty uncertain terms.

So I'm inclined to grant the -- just tell them -- and this is what I would say: On Friday, you requested the transcript of the testimony of Defendant Matthew Parrott. I told you that the transcript was not available; however -- and then I would read the suggested -- if you have a specific question about a particular witness's testimony, or any portion of it, you may send the Court a note requesting that testimony, and the Court will consider reading back the requested testimony to the jury. I think that's fairly innocuous. I mean, I have the same concerns that we've got I don't know how many witnesses. I would hate to get bogged down asking for so much of this, but it's --

MR. KOLENICH: We don't disagree with that, Your Honor. But I think the emphasis needs to be on the specific request, rather than -- because if you say it like the way the Court just read it, they might interpret it as: Well, we did. We asked for the testimony of Matt Parrott, which is specific.

THE COURT: When I was reading that, I think I'll say testimony of a witness, instead of focusing on him.

Case 3:17-cv-00072-NKM-JCH Document 1472 Filed 11/22/21 Page 6 of 22 Pageid#: 6

Sines, et al. v. Kessler, et al., 3:17CV72, 11/22/2021

MR. KOLENICH: Maybe part of the testimony of a witness; otherwise, we might end up having to give them -- or them again requesting all the testimony of Matt Parrott, which took up half a day.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MS. KAPLAN: I think, Mr. Kolenich, the language we suggested, which I think the judge tends to read after the "however" line says a specific question about the testimony of a witness. I think we're in agreement on that.

Again, if what is hanging them up, Your Honor, is whether a particular witness was at a particular location on a particular day and they think that's the kind of thing that's appropriate for read-back --

THE COURT: I think the problem with the instructions I have given them so far, it seems like the door is slammed on any --

MS. KAPLAN: What's concerned us over the weekend, Your Honor, is they may not even know that read-backs exist. So that's what pushed them.

THE COURT: I'm going to make that adjustment, send them a note.

Anything else before we -- I mean, they're deliberating. We can just adjourn until we hear --

MR. KOLENICH: Nothing else, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- until we get a message from Garcia.

MS. KAPLAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

```
Case 3:17-cv-00072-NKM-JCH Document 1472 Filed 11/22/21 Page 7 of 22 Pageid#: 7
        Sines, et al. v. Kessler, et al., 3:17CV72, 11/22/2021
 1
              MR. CAMPBELL: Thank you, Your Honor.
 2
              (Recess, 9:07 a.m. To 10:13 a.m.)
 3
              THE COURT: Another question. You may want to listen
             It's short, but I'm not sure we quite understand it.
 4
 5
              "Does final jury instruction 32, which reads,
    'negligence defenses, including assumption of risk,
 6
 7
   contributory negligence, and sudden emergency are not valid
   defenses to any of the claims that plaintiffs bring against
 8
 9
   defendants. I instruct you to disregard these defenses when
   assessing defendants' liability.'"
10
11
              The question is: "Does final jury instruction number
12
   32 apply only to financial liability"?
13
              MS. KAPLAN: I'm stumped too, Your Honor.
14
              THE COURT: I mean, it applies to everything.
15
   just not a defense. I don't know how to make it much clearer.
16
              MS. DUNN: We would have thought this was the
17
   clearest instruction in the pile.
18
              THE COURT:
                          I could just say no, it applies to --
19
   applies to any of the claims. Are not valid defenses to any of
20
   the claims.
21
              MR. LEVINE: Exactly.
22
              THE COURT: Actually, no one has argued any -- I
```

23

24

25

think the words may have popped up somewhere, but no one has argued negligence or assumption of the risk or anything.

MR. KOLENICH: A couple of questions were asked that

THE COURT: I mean, one thing you can say, I think what it means is the defendants are not to be considered responsible for their injuries.

MR. ISAACSON: The plaintiffs?

22

23

24

MR. ISAACSON: All of plaintiffs' claims.

24

25

Answer: No, it applies to --

Sines, et al. v. Kessler, et al., 3:17CV72, 11/22/2021 THE COURT: -- all of the claims. 1 2 MR. KOLENICH: Maybe the Court could say this is not 3 a negligence case, so negligence defenses don't apply to any of the claims. 4 5 MS. KAPLAN: Okay. Well, maybe they're making 6 progress. We can always hope. 7 THE COURT: Well, how about that: No, it applies to 8 all of the claims of the plaintiffs. This is not a negligence 9 case, and so there are no defenses. MR. CAMPBELL: Well, not that there are no defenses. 10 11 MR. KOLENICH: No negligence defenses. 12 THE COURT: Well, I want to be sure. No negligence defenses. 13 14 MS. KAPLAN: We're okay with that, Your Honor. MS. DUNN: Your Honor, I don't know if Mr. DeRise is 15 16 writing it. Do you want us to write what you just said? 17 THE COURT: Are you getting it down? 18 Let's say it again. The answer is: No, it applies 19 to all of the claims. This is not a negligence case and 20 negligence defenses do not apply, which is in the heading of 21 the instruction. 22 Okay? 23 MS. DUNN: Your Honor, instead of it applies to all 24 the claims, can you say, no, it applies to all plaintiffs'

claims against defendants, just because we don't --

THE COURT: Well, it looks like they're quoting something out of an instruction to me because -- which, I mean, I think you're right. Words are not a form of violence. But in instruction -- for instruction 30, the fact that an agreement to engage in illegal conduct necessarily takes, quote, "the form of words," end quote also does not confer upon it, or upon the underlying conduct, protection under the First Amendment.

MR. KOLENICH: Perhaps the answer, Your Honor, should be: Words alone are not a form of violence.

MS. KAPLAN: I don't have a search to pull up. Is

MS. KAPLAN: I don't have a search to pull up. Is the only use of the word "words" in that -- is that 30?

MS. DUNN: That's 30. That's the last paragraph of the First Amendment instruction.

MR. SPENCER: Your Honor, I might be wrong, but I think they're looking at the big picture on this one. I don't think it's about that. I think everyone would agree that you can't use words to embezzle money from your company and that's somehow protected by the First Amendment. I think this is a big picture issue they're contemplating.

THE COURT: I don't know what they're talking about.

It seems to me they're talking about a specific instruction.

MR. LEVINE: Your Honor, I think directing them to the particular instructions, and either reading it to them in open court or directing them to it is a way to go here, and not

Sines, et al. v. Kessler, et al., 3:17CV72, 11/22/2021 trying to answer it literally, but to give them the instruction 2 in the context. 3 MR. CAMPBELL: Well, I think the response should include the literal answer no, certainly, even if something 4 5 else is added. 6 MR. SPENCER: Yes. 7 MS. KAPLAN: I don't think there's any legal answer. 8 I don't think that's a legal answer. 9 THE COURT: They're talking about is it federal law? I don't know what --10 11 MS. KAPLAN: I don't think you can find federal law 12 the definition of words, not violence. I don't think anything exists. 13 14 MR. SPENCER: Again, I think this is a big-picture issue. You have to express that. 15 16 THE COURT: We don't know what they're talking about, 17 frankly. That's the problem. 18 MR. SPENCER: I can't know that, but I can sense that. 19 20 MR. KOLENICH: The Court told them that the abject 21 arguing in favor of violence standing alone is not -- it is 22 First Amendment protected. So they have to find something 23 besides rhetoric or words. It has to be words that form a 24 conspiracy. If they want to refer them just to the jury 25 instructions, I think there wouldn't be a question if they

Sines, et al. v. Kessler, et al., 3:17CV72, 11/22/2021 1 understood the jury instructions. 2 MS. DUNN: Your Honor, there is -- the First 3 Amendment instruction gives the instruction in this area of conversation. So we would propose pointing them to this 4 5 instruction and seeing if they still have a question after that. 6 7 THE COURT: Say that again now. 8 MS. DUNN: Because the First Amendment instruction, 9 number 30, addresses this issue, we would propose directing them to this instruction and then seeing if they have 10 11 additional questions after that. 12 THE COURT: I think this comes right out of that instruction. 13 We agree. 14 MS. KAPLAN: That's why I would ask them --15 THE COURT: 16 MS. KAPLAN: I could be wrong, Your Honor, but my 17 recollection is that's the only time the word "words" is used 18 in the entire set of instructions. So it makes sense. 19 THE COURT: I could just say I refer you to 20 instruction number 30. 21 MR. LEVINE: Exactly. 22 THE COURT: And that's the best answer I can give 23 you. 24 MR. SPENCER: I agree with Mr. Campbell, though. If 25 this is a philosophical question, I think it can be answered,

Sines, et al. v. Kessler, et al., 3:17CV72, 11/22/2021 1 or at least you could offer quidelines for answering it. 2 answer is no. 3 THE COURT: I don't think it's philosophical. think they're asking specifically about the instruction. 4 5 MR. LEVINE: Your Honor, the good thing about your instructions is that they're balanced. You give each side 6 7 during the course of an instruction. And so if Your Honor 8 directs them to the relevant instruction, then it's a very 9 balanced presentation to answer the question. THE COURT: Well, is the First Amendment instruction 10 30? 11 12 MS. KAPLAN: 30, Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: Do you all think that that's confusing? 14 I mean, if you read it, it looks to me like it speaks for 15 itself. 16 MS. KAPLAN: I mean, the one thing -- with respect to 17 Mr. Spencer, the one thing that Your Honor shouldn't do is 18 involve itself in philosophical debate about abstract words and 19 what they mean, because it's all in the context of this case. 20 MR. KOLENICH: Your Honor, the technical answer to 21 the question is no. You could just say no. 22 MS. KAPLAN: I don't think it is a technical answer 23 to the question. 24 MS. DUNN: It's not. I mean, my concern, Your Honor,

is that going beyond this is going to invite some sort of

Sines, et al. v. Kessler, et al., 3:17CV72, 11/22/2021 1 error. Like we have an instruction that speaks to this issue 2 directly and it's a lawful instruction. And I think if we 3 start mutating this, it may create problems. MR. CAMPBELL: Are you taking the position words are 4 5 a form of violence? 6 MR. LEVINE: The instruction itself clarifies it. 7 MR. KOLENICH: I think you should at least say the 8 words have to form a conspiracy, an agreement. 9 MR. SPENCER: Yes. MR. KOLENICH: Words alone are not violence. 10 11 have to amount to something more than -- that seems to be what 12 they're asking. In other words, if the defendants walk by 13 chanting things, is that violence? I think pretty clearly it is not. 14 15 MS. KAPLAN: But the problem with that is that brings 16 in almost every other instruction in the case, because if they 17 have words and they form a conspiracy and there is an overt act 18 of violence in the conspiracy, then they're liable for the 19 conspiracy. So I don't think that works. 20 MR. KOLENICH: So the words have to amount to a 21 conspiracy because words alone --22 MS. KAPLAN: But that's already in the conspiracy 23 instruction. 24 MR. KOLENICH: Well, then at least refer them to more

than 30. Refer them to the conspiracy instruction as well.

```
1
             MS. DUNN: I think the problem is there is -- there
 2
   are other claims in this case. And making things up at this
 3
   point is going to confuse the issue. I mean, there are claims
   about intentional infliction of emotional distress. There are
 4
 5
   claims about the underlying hate crime statute under Virginia
   law. This is an area that, if we do not want to try this case
 6
 7
   again, I do not recommend going down this road.
 8
             MR. KOLENICH: Can we at least give them 30 and then
 9
   whatever -- what is it, 13 is the --
10
             MS. DUNN: No. I would give them 30. They're not
11
   shy about asking questions. You know, if they have more
12
   questions --
13
             THE COURT: What is -- I was looking at 17.
14
             The word "form" is not anywhere on the jury verdict,
15
   is it?
16
             MS. KAPLAN: I don't recall it being there.
17
             MS. DUNN: I don't see it anywhere. We could search.
18
             THE COURT: I don't know why it would be.
19
             MS. DUNN: I only see it in instruction 30.
20
             THE COURT: I just think instruction 30 covers it. I
21
   don't know why -- I mean, it refers --
22
             MS. KAPLAN: We agree, Your Honor.
23
             THE COURT: -- to the First Amendment. It refers to
24
    the United States Constitution.
```

MR. SPENCER: I agree. And I think that's why

Sines, et al. v. Kessler, et al., 3:17CV72, 11/22/2021 1 they're asking the question, because it's a bigger thing. This 2 is something that --3 THE COURT: But we're not trying a bigger thing. We're trying a case based on the facts in this case. 4 5 MR. SPENCER: I agree. But everything is within a bigger philosophical concept. Even the smallest thing, 6 7 the fall of a sparrow, is within a bigger, wider context. THE COURT: Well, that's --8 9 MR. KOLENICH: Your Honor, we --10 MR. SPENCER: They're asking about that. They're 11 sincerely asking about it. 12 MR. KOLENICH: We did request an instruction that any 13 advocacy of violence has to be advocating imminent violence in order to violate the First Amendment, and I'm not sure the 14 Court gave that instruction. So I think this question kind of 15 16 gets back to that, which is certainly correct First Amendment 17 law. Advocacy of violence, violent rhetoric, has to lead to 18 imminent violence, or else it's protected. 19 Now, at the same time, it's true that if this

advocacy amounts to a conspiracy, it's not protected, which the Court has already told them. But there is a missing piece here.

MR. CAMPBELL: It's still not a form of violence.

MR. KOLENICH: Right. They ask is the words themselves a form of violence. And I don't think that --

20

21

22

23

24

```
1
             MS. KAPLAN: Your Honor, what I would respectfully
 2
   suggest is this area is perhaps one of the most complicated
 3
   areas -- as Your Honor knows -- of federal law and
   constitutional law. We have instructions in this case.
 4
 5
   should stick with the instructions in this case. As my
   colleague, Karen, said, getting out of that, particularly in
 6
 7
   the area of the First Amendment, is always treacherous. They
   have an instruction. They should look at the instruction.
 8
 9
             THE COURT: What about the thing that you say I
   didn't instruct on imminent violence.
10
11
             MR. KOLENICH: I don't think it's in the
12
   instructions, Your Honor.
13
             MS. DUNN: It's not, because this is not an
14
   incitement case. We're not talking about that.
15
             I think there is a lot of peril in starting to talk
16
   more expansively about this area. We are going to invite a
17
   problem, in my view.
18
             THE COURT: All right. You all may sit down or go
19
   somewhere. I'm going to -- I want to take a look at this. I
20
   mean, what I'm thinking right now is saying: I'm referring you
21
   to instruction 30. If that doesn't answer your question, let
22
   us know what instruction you're talking about.
23
             MS. KAPLAN: Sounds right to us, Your Honor.
24
             MS. DUNN: Thank you, Your Honor.
25
              (Pause.)
```

THE COURT: This is what I told you I was going to do: "I'll refer you to instruction number 30. If that does not answer your question, which instruction are you referring to?"

(Recess, 11:51 a.m. to 12:09 p.m.)

THE COURT: This one says, "If we cannot come to a unanimous decision on the first three claims, do we still decide on Claims 4, 5, and 6"?

I wouldn't read a whole lot into that, just given the way the questions have come. Obviously, they do have to consider 4, 5, and 6; but I don't want them to stop at 1, 2, and 3 yet.

MR. CAMPBELL: I would definitely agree, yes, Your Honor, we would ask that they consider 4, 5, and 6 regardless, of course.

THE COURT: I don't understand why there is any misunderstanding about that. I think I'm going to tell them they must continue to try to reach a unanimous decision on all six counts.

MS. KAPLAN: We agree, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Because I think there's too much into it not to ultimately have to go for the *Allen* charge. I don't want to give it now.

MS. KAPLAN: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.

25 (Recess, 12:11 p.m. to 4:41 p.m.)

```
Case 3:17-cv-00072-NKM-JCH Document 1472 Filed 11/22/21 Page 21 of 22 Pageid# 21
        Sines, et al. v. Kessler, et al., 3:17CV72, 11/22/2021
                          The jury is coming back tomorrow, and I'm
 1
              THE COURT:
   just going to call them in to tell them to not talk about the
 2
 3
    case.
 4
              MS. KAPLAN: Okay.
 5
              THE COURT: So you all can take a seat.
 6
    (Jury in, 4:43 p.m.)
 7
              THE COURT: Members of the jury, I want you to know
 8
   we continue to appreciate your continued hard work. I know
 9
   this is not easy, but the reason I called you in is I have to
10
    tell you every day when you're released not to discuss the case
   with anyone, or allow anyone to discuss it with you or remain
11
12
   within hearing of anyone discussing it. Do not read or watch
   or listen to anything outside the courthouse concerning the
13
          And so you're excused at this time.
14
    case.
15
              Thank you.
16
    (Jury out, 4:44 p.m.)
    (Proceedings adjourned, 4:44 p.m.)
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```

CERTIFICATE

I, Lisa M. Blair, RMR/CRR, Official Court Reporter for the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, appointed pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 753, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript of the proceedings reported by me using the stenotype reporting method in conjunction with computer-aided transcription, and that same is a true and correct transcript to the best of my ability and understanding.

I further certify that the transcript fees and format comply with those prescribed by the Court and the Judicial Conference of the United States.

/s/ Lisa M. Blair Date: November 22, 2021